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Abstract
After the de facto separation of China in 1949, the international community was divided on the 
issue which government represents the Chinese nation as a whole. Until the 1970s the Repub-
lic of China (ROC) on Taiwan maintained its seat in the UN, and formal ties to a significant 
number of countries. However, by the end of this decade, in 1980, Taipei government was left 
with merely 22 diplomatic allies.1 Our article focuses on the position of Taiwan after this shift, 
examining the regime’s perception of the effects of recognition and derecognition. As the Taipei 
government has put significant efforts into the preservation (and expansion) of diplomatic rela-
tions with states that are not considered globally influential, we examined what possible effects 
and consequences these ties can have on the international legal status of the entity. It has to be 
noted that for this purpose, only the official relations, and diplomatic allies of the ROC were 
considered. After describing the diplomatic activities of Taiwan, and the shifts in the number 
of its diplomatic allies (between 1988–2020), we found three main areas which are positively 
affected by these ties. They provide basis for the regime’s claim to sovereignty and statehood, 
and they enhance Taiwanese presence in international institutions (and indicate the unresolved 
nature of the entity’s international legal status). Most importantly, they help to maintain the in-
ternational nature of the cross-strait conflict and contribute to preserve the status quo. 
1  Tubilewicz 2007. 7.
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1 Introduction
The island of Taiwan is situated in East Asia, between the South China Sea and the East China 
Sea. It is separated from continental Asia by the Taiwan Strait, which lies between the island and 
the east coast of China.2 The Taiwan Strait, however, is not the only factor separating Taiwan 
from Mainland China. The Chinese Civil War between the forces of the Kuomintang (KMT), 
led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, resulted 
in the de facto division of China in 1949.3 The government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) exercises authority over the Mainland territory. Taiwan (along with the islands of Peng-
hu, Kinmen, and Matsu) remained under the de facto control of the Republic of China (ROC).4
Today the Beijing government represents ‘China’ in most bilateral relations, and multilateral 
forums (such as the United Nations) as well. The Taipei government has merely 15 official dip-
lomatic partner states (as of November 2020),5 and no seat in the United Nations (UN).6  Even 
though the number of states who recognize the ROC is low (and declining), sustaining these 
formal relations are of utmost importance for Taiwan.7 We wondered whether these relations 
have meaningful effects on the entity’s global position, therefore, we asked the question; do the 
remaining diplomatic ties of Taiwan enhance its international legal status? If yes, in what ways?
2  Salter 2004. 8–10.
3  Maggiorelli 2019. 183–184.
4  Kan – Morrison 2014. 12.
5  Diplomatic Allies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan).
6  Huang 2003. 81–82.
7  Maggiorelli 2019. 181–182.
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2 The one-China principle
In order to find the reason behind the low international recognition of the Taiwanese regime, we 
have to consider the ‘one-China principle’. In spite of the de facto separation of the state, the 
legal unity of ‘China’ was upheld by both parties. They considered Taiwan to be part of the one 
Chinese state, this is the one-China principle.8 Their judgement only diverged in terms of who 
the legitimate government of the whole of ‘China’ was.9 This understanding implies that for-
eign states (who wished to conduct official diplomatic relations with China) had to choose their 
representative for the Chinese nation, exclusively either the Beijing or the Taipei government.10 
Until the 1970s the ROC enjoyed the recognition of the US and most ‘Western powers’.11 In 
addition, the ROC had been one of the founding nations of the United Nations (UN), it also held 
a seat in the Security Council (UNSC), as a permanent member.12 In 1971 the representatives of 
the ROC were expelled from the UN, and their seats were assigned to the PRC.13  This decision 
was shortly followed by many states switching their recognition from the Taipei to the Beijing 
government, most notably, the by the United States.14 
It is important to acknowledge the fact that Taiwan had made attempts to achieve dual rec-
ognition, like in 1989, which failed due to the counteractions of Beijing.15 Therefore, it can be 
argued that the ROC in the past decades have been known for trying to ‘stretch’ the one-China 
principle, and interpreting it in a quite flexible way.16 However, abandoning the doctrine is not 
possible without retaliation from Mainland China.17 Thus, overall, we would like to point out 
that officially the one-China principle still continues to dominate international affairs.18 
3 Countering derecognition – Taiwan’s diplomatic 
struggle 
Ever since the simultaneous existence of the PRC and the ROC regimes started, there have been 
a competition between the two governments to acquire recognition from the other states.19 Gen-
erally we can notice that connecting recognition to economic gains is not a novel phenomenon.20 
8  Chen 2017. 30.
9  Crawford 2007. 5.
10  Björn 2008a. para. 5.
11  Albert 2016. 2. 
12  Huang 2003. 78–81. 
13  Huang 2003. 82.
14  Hsieh 2007. 774.
15  Hughes 2003. 54–55. 
16  Hughes 2003. 49; 130. 
17  Jacobs 2012. 121.; Anti-Secession Law (Full Text) (03/15/05). Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
United States of America. 
18  Hickson 2003. 5. 
19  Maggiorelli 2019. 180. 
20  Rich 2009. 171.
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Therefore, it is not surprising, that the ROC government has long been using economic tools to 
further its diplomatic interests. The regime started providing assistance to Africa, and to Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the early 1960s with the concrete aim of gaining recognition.21 
3.1 ‘Checkbook diplomacy’ 
The role of these foreign aid instruments tremendously increased when, by 1979, Taiwan was 
left without a seat in the UN, without recognition by the US, and with the alliance of only 22 
countries. This is especially true for the period that started after the death of Chiang Ching-
kuo, as in 1988 Lee Teng-hui, the new president started to implement his new foreign policy 
approach.22 He called his strategy ‘flexible’ or ‘pragmatic’ diplomacy and identified the main 
objective as Taiwan’s emergence from international isolation.23 As a means of achieving this 
goal, Taiwan did not abstain from using ‘checkbook diplomacy’.24 
Nevertheless, what exactly do we mean by ‘checkbook diplomacy’? In simple terms, it is 
‘purchasing’ recognition. In the case of Taiwan, the regime provides various forms of economic 
benefits (such as loans, donations, and investments) to a state,25 and in return it expects either 
the creation or the maintenance of formal relations. For instance, Niger decided to recognize the 
Taipei government in 1992, shortly after receiving a loan of US$50 million from the regime.26 
Ending diplomatic ties have inverse effects, for example El Salvador decided to switch recogni-
tion to the PRC in 2018,27 and as a result the ROC decided to relocate “six of its aid programs”28 
from El Salvador.
Utilizing economic instruments in order to gain recognition is not an alien concept to the 
PRC either, the Beijing government managed to seize many diplomatic allies from Taiwan by 
using such tactics.29 For instance, in the above-mentioned case of El Salvador, the PRC prom-
ised to provide funding for a project in the Central American country (which project was pre-
viously deemed excessively pricey and unethical by the ROC government).30 Additionally, it 
must be noted that ‘checkbook diplomacy’ is not an official name for the foreign policy strategy 
of the competing governments, they mutually condemn such practices by the other side of the 
Taiwan Strait.31 
21  Tubilewicz 2007. 6–7. 
22  Nemeskéri 1998. 11.
23  Tubilewicz 2007. 7–9.
24  Michelon 1997. 45. 
25  Michelon 1997. 47.
26  Rich 2009. 172. 
27  Shattuck 2020. 350.
28  Maggiorelli, 2019. 195. 
29  Shattuck 2020. 335.
30  Shattuck 2020. 346-347. 
31  Rich 2009. 182. 
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In this ‘interest-based’ diplomatic contest, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
became the most important battlegrounds,32 as well as island countries on the South Pacific33 
(although, during the 1990s, Taiwan made significant efforts to develop relations with post-com-
munist Central and Eastern European states).34 It is very much apparent that by using economic 
aid instruments, mostly “smaller countries which are more in need of development assistance”35 
can be targeted. Therefore, the centers of the ‘checkbook diplomacy’ of the PRC and the ROC 
are states that generally do not play significant roles internationally.36 
3.2 Evaluating the diplomatic contest
 
In this section, we will look at whether Taiwan’s allocation of resources and provision of as-
sistance to preserve and enhance international recognition37 achieved its goal. We decided to 
divide the period between 1988 (the beginning of flexible diplomacy)38 and 2020 into three 
different periods to examine. The first period consists of the administrations of Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian (1988–2000 and 2000–2008, respectively), the second only includes the 
presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016)39, and the third follows the presidency of Tsai Ing-
wen from 2016 until 2020.40 After individually considering these three periods, we will present 
a comprehensive picture of the achievements. 
Between 1988 and 2008, the ROC was very focused on establishing new diplomatic rela-
tions, and ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was regarded as an essential instrument of this policy.41 Gen-
erally, it can be argued that purely in terms of the number of allies, the beginning of the 1990s 
was a positive development for the ROC.42 In 1988, the Taipei government was recognized by 
merely 22 states, by 1995 this number rose to 30. The number of official diplomatic partners had 
not been this high since 1974. However, it appears that 30 was the peak, because after 1996 this 
number of allies was never reached again.43 
During the 2000s, the ROC could establish formal ties with only 3 states, the last of which 
happened in 2007, when Saint Lucia switched recognition from the Beijing to the Taipei gov-
ernment.44 As a result of these modest gains, and the greater advances of the PRC, by the 
start of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, the regime only had 23 partners.45 President Ma decided to 
32  Rich – Banerjee 2015. 145. 
33  Tubilewicz 2007. 15.
34  Tubilewicz 2007. 46-50. 
35  Maggiorelli 2019. 199.
36  Shattuck 2020. 339.
37  Rich 2009. 184. 
38  Tubilewicz 2007. 7-9.
39  Presidents & vice presidents since 1947. Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan).
40  President & vice president. Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan). 
41  Michelon 1997. 50. 
42  Maggiorelli 2019. 181. 
43  Tubilewicz 2007. 7-11. 
44  Tubilewicz 2007. 11.
45  Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 253.
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establish a so-called ‘diplomatic truce’ with Mainland China, which put an end to ‘checkbook 
diplomacy’.46 The rival governments agreed to refrain from poaching “the other’s diplomatic 
allies”47. Due to this agreement, there was no significant change in the number of Taiwanese 
diplomatic partners. Nevertheless, the diplomatic truce did not seem to concern Gambia, as the 
African state decided to derecognize the ROC in 2013.48 
The start of the first presidential term of Tsai Ing-wen made cross-strait relations ‘cooler’49, 
which also meant the termination of the diplomatic truce by Beijing. On the other hand, Presi-
dent Tsai affirmed that her administration would not relaunch ‘checkbook diplomacy’.50 How-
ever, it is apparent that the preservation of allies continues to be regarded essential.51 
Since 2016 Taiwan has already lost 7 diplomatic allies,52 therefore the regime (as of No-
vember 2020) maintains official ties with solely 15 states. Geographically, the majority of these 
states are located in Latin America and the Caribbean (9 countries), or in East Asia and the 
Pacific (4 states). Additionally, the Taipei government has one ally in Europe (the Holy See), as 
well as in Africa (Eswatini).53
3.3 The shortcomings of ‘checkbook diplomacy’
Overall, “the delivery of development aid constitutes an effective instrument of public diplo-
macy”54, however, excessive reliance on this method does not usually bring the expected or 
hoped results.55 This experience can be noticed in the case of Taiwan as well. The first period of 
‘checkbook diplomacy’, could be regarded as quite successful, as it increased the number of the 
allies of the ROC. However, it proved to be rather difficult and (in most instances) unsuccessful 
to keep these new ties, as already by the start of the 2000s, the number of official partners started 
to decline yet again.56
The instability of ‘checkbook diplomacy’ is due to some of the factors that make this foreign 
policy practice possible, namely that it is very easy to switch recognition, and that states try to 
maximize their economic benefits.57 “Whenever better conditions”58 are being offered by one 
of the two governments, ‘opportunistic’ states can choose the more ‘generous’ option.59 For 
46  Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 254.
47  Shattuck 2020. 355.
48  Shattuck 2020. 337.
49  Chen 2017. 4. 
50  Shattuck 2020. 335. 
51  Maggiorelli 2019. 196–201.
52  Shattuck 2020. 335–336. 
53  Diplomatic Allies. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan).
54  Maggiorelli 2019. 181.
55  Maggiorelli 2019. 198.
56  Tubilewicz 2007. 7–11.
57  Rich 2009. 183.
58  Tudoroiu 2017. 205.
59  Tudoroiu 2017. 205.
109Studies2020. 3. 
instance, the state of Nauru switched recognition twice within the period of 2003-2005,60 and 
Papua New Guinea managed to change alliances twice within the year of 1999.61 
Moreover, it is obvious, that “on a dollar for dollar base”62 Taiwan does not have the means 
to compete with Mainland China, the second largest economy of the world.63 Additionally to 
direct financial contributions to a country, states switching to recognize the PRC also benefit 
from enhanced trade relations therewith.64 Also, it must be kept in mind that apart from cre-
ating economic incentives, the Beijing government can also exert pressure on states to make 
this switch.65 Therefore, as Thomas J. Shattuck put it, “overall, Taiwan, on its own, is not well 
positioned to counter China’s tactics”66. 
4. Enhancing the international legal status of Taiwan?
In the previous sections we illustrated the attempts of Taiwan to maintain (and to form) diplo-
matic relations in order to combat international isolation, as well as the importance and success 
of said efforts. It can be concluded that the results of the foreign policy of Taipei are mixed at 
best.67 However, the process to achieve these humble outcomes is very costly68 and sometimes 
has negative implications on the regime’s international reputation.69 Why is this foreign policy 
still worth pursuing? What possible effects can the remaining formal diplomatic relations have 
on Taiwan’s international legal status? 
4.1 Supporting the international presence of Taiwan 
Diplomatic allies in a way enable the Taipei government to continue to appear in international 
organizations, as they raise and support the issue of Taiwanese application to these forums.70 
For instance, in 1993 seven Latin American partners of the ROC advocated for adding the 
question of the representation of Taiwan to the agenda of the year’s UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) session. This attempt was unsuccessful, the issue was only discussed by a commit-
tee.71 However, from 1993 until 2008 each year,72 there was a UN Petition endorsed by (some) 
60  Rich 2009. 173.
61  Tubilewicz 2007. 11.
62  Maggiorelli 2019. 203.
63  GDP (current US$). The World Bank.
64  Maggiorelli 2019. 189.
65  Shattuck 2020. 335.
66  Shattuck 2020. 348.
67  Maggiorelli 2019. 203. 
68  Rich 2009. 184. 
69  Tudoroiu 2017. 205. 
70  Rich 2009. 181. 
71  Klintworth 1994. 283–284.
72  Wang – Lee – Yu 2011. 260. 
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ROC diplomatic partners.73 None of these were successful, nevertheless, they reminded the 
international community “that the issue of Taiwan is not resolved.”74
On the other hand, it is important to note, that these functions are not exclusive to official 
allies, since non-official partners of the ROC regime are also capable and willing to do these 
supporting activities in international forums (except for the UNGA). Major states (e.g. the US, 
Canada) endorse Taiwanese participation, with the same, futile results.75 
4.2 Status quo maintenance
Evidently, the division of China has been ‘internationalized’ since 1950, when the US decided 
to protect the ROC on Taiwan from the forces of Mao Zedong.76 This international nature was 
also reflected in the fact that both governments of ‘China’ has had their own diplomatic allies 
throughout their coexistence. 
Undoubtedly, there is a marked imbalance between the number of states who recognize the 
PRC, and the states who recognize the ROC (180 and 15, respectively).77 Still, official ties with 
this handful of states assist the Taiwan regime in its efforts to maintain the international aspect 
of the cross-strait conflict.78 The significance of ‘internationalization’ is that it serves as protec-
tion or “buffer against the use of force.”79 
Timothy S. Rich summarizes this rationale excellently as “Recognition is crucial to Taiwan’s 
national security, not only to prevent further isolation but to deny the PRC the ability to swallow 
Taiwan without international objection, while making forced reunification more difficult.”80 
Nonetheless, it should be considered that Taiwan as a de facto regime, with or without recog-
nition by other states, would still be protected by the UN Charter “against the threat or use of 
force by the PRC government.”81 
Additionally, preserving some degree of recognition is deemed as essential (by the Taipei 
government) to be able to continue upholding its “claim to sovereignty”82 and legitimacy.83 
On the whole, it can be argued that the remaining diplomatic ties, on one hand, help the ROC 
to avoid increasing international isolation, and on the other, extend the current status quo,84 in 
which Taiwan functions as a de facto independent entity.85 
73  Rich 2009. 181.
74  Rich 2009. 182. 
75  Shattuck 2020. 343. 
76  Hughes 2003. 16. 
77  Shattuck 2020. 335. 
78  Michelon 1994. 49.; Tubilewicz 2007. 23. 
79  Hickson 2003. 6. 
80  Rich 2009. 180. 
81  Björn 2008b. para. 22.
82  Tubilewicz 2007. 14. 
83  Harwit 2000. 465. 
84  Maggiorelli 2019. 202–203.
85  Rich – Banerjee 2015. 146. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our set of research questions; ‘Do the remaining diplomatic ties of Taiwan enhance its inter-
national legal status? If yes, in what ways?’ focused on the regime’s place in the international 
arena. We began dealing with this issue by examining the group of states that continued to main-
tain diplomatic ties with the Taiwanese regime. It is apparent that by the middle of the 1990s, 
the Taipei government lost all of its formal relations with internationally influential states.86 
However, this was also the time period when the regime very actively tried to find new diplo-
matic allies,87 and in course of achieving this purpose, it did not refrain from using ‘checkbook 
diplomacy’.88 It was also discussed that ‘checkbook diplomacy’ methods are appealing to states 
that are “poor, heavily indebted”89 and do not play prominent roles in international politics.90 
Afterward, we followed the results of Taiwanese efforts to form and maintain official rela-
tions. Regarding this aim, only modest results were detected,91 but for high costs.92 Even though 
this finding did not provide immediate answers to the questions, it still demonstrated that the 
existence of formal ties are regarded to be paramount by the leadership of the regime,93 which in-
dicates that diplomatic relations are perceived to have effects on the global position of Taiwan.94 
Consequently, we presented three factors that are either positively affected or assisted by the 
presence of diplomatic allies. These factors are rather linked to each other. Firstly, diplomatic 
relations have a quite ‘symbolic’ impact,95 as they provide some basis for the ROC government 
to keep claiming sovereignty and statehood.96 Furthermore, official allies facilitate the indirect 
presence of Taiwan in international organizations (most notably the UN), as they advocate for 
the admission of the regime to the forum.97 This advocacy is rarely successful, however, it 
serves as a reminder for states that the question of Taiwan has not been resolved yet.98
This leads us to the final argument, which is that the fact that both governments are recog-
nized by a number of states, ‘internationalizes’ the conflict and cross-strait relations as well to 
a certain extent99 (even though both entities formally belong to ‘China’100). This international 
nature serves as a safeguard against the use of force101 or a unilateral act of reunification.102
86  Copper 1992. 211. 
87  Tubilewicz 2007. 7-9.
88  Michelon 1997. 47.
89  Tudoroiu 2017. 202. 
90  Shattuck 2020. 339.
91  Maggiorelli 2019. 203.
92  Rich 2009. 184.
93  Maggiorelli 2019. 180-182. 
94  Michelon 1997. 49.
95  Michelon 1997. 49.
96  Tubilewicz 2007. 14.
97  Rich 2009. 181.
98  Rich 2009. 182.
99  Michelon 1997. 49.; Tubilewicz 2007. 23.
100  Crawford 2007. 18–20.
101  Hickson 2003. 6.
102  Rich 2009. 180.
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Therefore, our answer to the asked questions is that the maintenance of formal relations with 
seemingly nonsignificant nations does enhance the international legal status of Taiwan. Taking 
into account the above-listed three factors leads to the conclusion, that the remaining diplomatic 
ties on the one hand are meaningful to avoid an even higher degree of diplomatic isolation, and 
on the other, they assist to the preservation of the status quo.103 
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